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COMMENT
DAVEY JONES’S LOCKUP: CHANGING
THE U.S. APPROACH TO PROSECUTION
AND PUNISHMENT OF MARITIME
PIRACY IN UNIVERSAL-
JURISDICTION CASES
COLLIN MCCARTHY*
I. INTRODUCTION
To the average American, the word “pirate” likely evokes images of
Johnny Depp, Captain Hook, or other peg-legged scallywags plundering
treasure-laden ships off the Spanish Main hundreds of years ago.  For
others, however, including thousands of mariners, their families, employ-
ers, national governments, and those relying on the timely delivery of
precious food and supplies, the threat of pirates at sea is not merely a
thing of the past.1  Although attacks once again appear to be on the de-
cline after reaching a staggering 445 reported incidents in 2010, the latest
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) figures show pirates attacked 245
vessels in 2014, with more than 440 mariners taken hostage.2  When cou-
pled with the fact that over ninety percent of the world’s trade is con-
* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, 2015. I would like to thank Laura
Patty for her advice and encouragement. I would also like to thank the members of the Golden Gate
University Law Review Board and Professor Ed Baskauskas for their feedback and assistance
preparing this Comment for publication.
1 See generally ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:
REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY–31 DECEMBER 2014 (2015), available at http://www.hellenic
shippingnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/2014-Annual-IMB-Piracy-Report-ABRIDGED.pdf.
2 Id. at 5, 11. Although the number of reported incidents of piracy appears to be on the
decline, there is a general consensus among those in the maritime community that a significant
percentage of pirate attacks go unreported due to fears of lengthy investigations, costly delays, and
increased insurance premiums. See DAVID F. MARLEY, Modern Piracy: A Reference Handbook,
66–67 (2010).
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ducted by ship,3 it is no wonder this threat to human safety and the free
flow of maritime commerce has emerged as a grave concern for govern-
ments and industry around the globe in recent years.4
  The latest upsurge in incidents occurring in West Africa’s Gulf of
Guinea and the waters of Southeast Asia demonstrates that maritime
piracy is not limited to any one region, but rather has reemerged as a
viable criminal enterprise for coastal crime syndicates around the globe.5
Unfortunately, as the pirates of today often hail from some of the most
lawless and under-resourced nations in the world, combating maritime
piracy in the modern era has proved to be an exceedingly difficult task.6
In Somalia, for example, extensive corruption, widespread poverty, and
the absence of a stable central government created an environment in
which pirate gangs could carry out their operations largely unfettered,
wreaking havoc on one of the world’s most vital shipping routes.7  Simi-
larly, increased conflict and “continued fragility in many West African
governments [have] provided space for pirate groups to operate,” threat-
ening one of the largest oil-producing regions in the world.8 With such
regions ill-equipped to combat the threat of piracy on their own, respon-
sibility for addressing the problem has fallen largely on the international
community, including national governments, international organizations,
and members of the shipping industry.9
  While the international response to piracy thus far, including the de-
ployment of multinational naval task forces, increased vessel security
measures, and various regional counter-piracy agreements has proved
successful in reducing the threat in recent years,10 the importance of a
comprehensive and consistent legal response to the piracy problem can-
not be overlooked. According to a recent UN Secretary General report,
3 Introduction to IMO, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx (last
visited Feb. 18, 2015).
4 See generally Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.
org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
5 See generally ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1; Bryan Abell, Return to Chaos: The
2013 Resurgence of Nigerian Piracy and 2014 Forecast, GCAPTAIN.COM (Jan. 14, 2014), http://
gcaptain.com/nigerian-piracy-resurgence-bryan-abell/.
6 See Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guanta´namo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pi-
rates and Terrorists, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 244–46 (2010).
7 See Christopher Alessi & Stephanie Hanson, Combating Maritime Piracy, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/piracy/combating-maritime-piracy/p18376 (last updated
Mar. 23, 2012).
8 Brandon Prins, What Drives Maritime Piracy in Sub-Saharan Africa?, PIRACY-STUDIES.ORG
(Nov. 11, 2014), http://piracy-studies.org/2014/what-drives-maritime-piracy-in-sub-saharan-africa/.
9 See Alessi & Hanson, supra note 7.
10 See Statement of Rear Adm. Joseph W. Kuzmick, U.S. Navy, Before the Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S.
House of Representatives, 3 (Apr. 10, 2013), available at http://www.navy.mil/ah_online/antipiracy/
images/gallery/testimony.pdf.
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nearly nine out of ten pirates captured by naval forces are released with-
out facing prosecution, significantly undermining any deterrent effect
such forces may have.11  This is in part because, despite international law
providing a “uniquely favorable framework for its suppression” by way
of the universal-jurisdiction doctrine,12 prosecution of pirates remains an
expensive and often complicated task.13  Evidentiary issues and deficient
domestic statutes are some of the most commonly cited obstacles to pros-
ecution, but fears over lengthy incarcerations and potential asylum
claims have also left many countries reluctant to exercise jurisdiction
over suspected pirates to the full extent of the law.14
  Recognizing the need for the United States government to take a lead-
ership role in confronting and suppressing the resurging threat of mari-
time piracy, this Comment evaluates the current status of maritime piracy
laws in the United States.  Moreover, as the use of legal mechanisms will
play a vital part in combating maritime piracy, this Comment seeks to
demonstrate that the statutory system as it stands is both outdated and ill-
suited for addressing the complexities of piracy in the modern era, and
will only impede the achievement of current strategic objectives.  More
specifically, as the crime of piracy is no longer committed by just one
rogue ship and its crew, this Comment highlights the need for a system
that takes into account the evolution of piracy to include multiple actors
both at sea and on shore, addressing varying degrees of culpability and
imposing sentences fit for the crime.  As evidenced by the recent deci-
sion striking down the sole U.S. universal jurisdiction piracy15 statute as
unconstitutional as applied,16 the system as it stands is inconsistent with
both U.S. and international standards, and limits use of the judicial sys-
tem as a means to suppress the crime.
11 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal
Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 2–3, UN DOC. S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_documents.htm (follow “S/2011/30” hyperlink;
then follow “English” hyperlink).
12 Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 244.
13 See JONATHAN BELLISH, ONE EARTH FOUND., THE ECONOMIC COST OF SOMALI PIRACY
2012, at 27–30 (2013), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
View%20Full%20Report_1.pdf.
14 See Yvonne M. Dutton, Pirates and Impunity: Is the Threat of Asylum Claims a Reason To
Allow Pirates To Escape Justice?, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 236, 239–41 (2011).
15 The term “general piracy” refers to the crime of piracy as defined by international law and
subject to universal jurisdiction, or subject to prosecution by any nation. In contrast, “municipal
piracy” may include any act deemed as piracy by the enacting government, but it requires a jurisdic-
tional nexus before that nation may prosecute. For example, in the United States, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1651 (Westlaw 2015) serves as the sole general piracy statute, incorporating by reference the
international definition of piracy. Other statutes, including 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1652 and 1655 (Westlaw
2015), enumerate certain acts amounting to municipal piracy. See United States v. Hasan, 747 F.
Supp. 2d 599, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010).
16 United States v. Said (Said II), 3 F. Supp. 3d 515 (E.D. Va. 2014).
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Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the size and scope
of the world’s piracy problem in 2015, as well as a brief discussion of the
responses taken by the international community to date.  Part III dis-
cusses the current system of piracy laws in the United States, explained
in light of what was learned from the first universal jurisdiction piracy
cases to be tried in nearly 200 years.  Part IV discusses the consequences
of these most recent decisions, arguing that the current one-statute-fits-all
approach is improper for addressing piracy in the twenty-first century, as
it is over-inclusive and unreasonably exposes certain individuals to pun-
ishments unfitting for their crimes.  Finally, Part V presents simple rec-
ommendations for updating the U.S. piracy statutory scheme, in
accordance with the principles of universal jurisdiction, international
law, and evolving standards of criminal punishment.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW: MARITIME PIRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
Although the crime of piracy has existed nearly as long as man has
sailed the seas, pirates have reemerged in recent decades to once again
pose a serious threat to mariners and marine transportation around the
globe.17  As noted above, despite international efforts leading to a steady
downturn since attacks reached a peak in 2010, the latest IMB reports
show the threat remains far from eradicated.  IMB figures place the total
number of reported attacks at roughly 1700 since 2010,18 though some
estimate the actual number of attacks to be closer to twice that amount,
as incidents frequently go unreported.19  Moreover, it is not only the
number of attacks that is alarming, but also the increasing success rate
and level of violence against crews.20  As piracy is no longer a new phe-
nomenon in many parts of the world, pirate gangs have grown increas-
ingly sophisticated and highly skilled in their operations, as well as more
heavily armed and dangerous.21  In sum, although it is encouraging that
17 See generally ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1; THE WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES
COUNTER PIRACY AND MARITIME SECURITY ACTION PLAN 2 (June 20, 2014), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/united_states_counter_piracy_and_maritime_security
_action_plan_2014.pdf (“Piracy and related maritime crime continue to plague mariners throughout
the world and will continue to pose obstacles to the lawful use of the maritime domain.”).
18 ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1, at 5.
19 See MARLEY, supra note 2, at 66–67.
20 See Alan Cowell, West African Piracy Exceeds Somali Attacks, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/africa/west-african-piracy-exceeds-so
mali-attacks-report-says.html?_r=0 (discussing the higher success rates of remaining Somali pirates
as well as the greater level of violence experienced in the latest West African attacks).
21 See id.
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the overall number of attacks appears to be on the decline, this decrease
in volume can be misleading.
A. THE MODERN PIRATE
Comparing the two side by side, the pirates of today and those of
centuries past share a number of similarities.  Modern pirates still attack,
loot, and hijack ships for ransom, and they still thrive in regions charac-
terized by political instability, ineffective law enforcement, and advanta-
geous geography.22  Many modern pirates are also the same kind of
ruthless individuals, known for spending their loot on “bling” and bad
habits rather than a new law-abiding lifestyle.23  Instead, the major dif-
ference in piracy today is not who is carrying out the attack, but rather
how they are doing it.
The first and perhaps most obvious difference in piracy operations
today stems from the dramatic advancements in weaponry and technol-
ogy, as well as the widespread availability of such equipment.24  Most
significantly, heavy machine guns, high-powered outboard engines, sat-
ellite phones, and GPS devices have all become commonplace in the
modern pirate’s outfit, giving them a significant advantage over their
early counterparts, as well as their intended targets.25  In a typical attack,
pirates locate their target, set out from a “mother ship” in speedy skiffs
armed with AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, grappling hooks, and
ladders, board the ship and seize the crew.26  Once on board, the pirates
will either rob the ship and its crew of any cash, electronics, or other
valuables, or in some instances, redirect the ship to a safe holding point
to unload cargo or contact the vessel owner.27  In cases of the latter, the
pirates can then use the ship, its crew, or its cargo as leverage in ransom
negotiations, or they can sell the ship’s cargo on the black market.28
A second major difference in maritime piracy today is the level of
sophistication in piracy operations, or more specifically, the number of
actors involved in the preparation and execution of any given attack, both
22 See Daniel Pines, Maritime Piracy: Changes in U.S. Law Needed To Combat This Critical
National Security Concern, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 69, 75–78 (2012).
23 Faith Karimi, African Pirates Use Millions of Dollars in Ransom on Drugs, Real Estate,
Prostitutes, CNN (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/02/world/africa/horn-of-africa-
piracy-loot/.
24 Neal Ungerleider, Somali Pirates Go High Tech, FAST COMPANY (June 22, 2011), http://
www.fastcompany.com/1762331/somali-pirates-go-high-tech.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annexes A, B.
28 Id.
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at sea and on shore.29  For example, in the case of Somali pirates, whose
activities may entail weeks or even months at sea, significant capital is
needed to fund piracy operations, often requiring as many as three to five
financial backers.30  Following a successful attack, additional players re-
ceiving a cut of the ransom include kingpins, negotiators, lawyers, and
bankers, as well as local militias in control of the region’s ports.31  Ac-
cording to some estimates, the pirates carrying out an attack receive as
little as one tenth of a percent of the total ransom payment, with finan-
ciers and militias receiving the bulk of the payout.32  This multifarious
system has made both capture and prosecution increasingly difficult, as
the pirates at sea make up just one small part of the larger groups respon-
sible for their attacks.33
B. PIRACY HOTSPOTS
1. Somalia and the Gulf of Aden
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden first began in the early 1990’s in response
to the collapse of the Somali government and economy, as well as fre-
quent toxic dumping and unauthorized fishing by foreign vessels.34
However, as former fishermen soon discovered vessel owners’ willing-
ness to pay out large sums for the safe return of their crews and cargo,
piracy in the region quickly evolved from “a fairly ad hoc, disorganized
effort to a highly developed criminal enterprise.”35  As Somalia-based
pirates grew increasingly experienced, incidents of piracy in the region
grew to as many as 236 in 2011, accounting for more than half of all
reported incidents worldwide that year.36
Equipped with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades,
Somali pirates set out in small outboard powered skiffs, tracking down
slow-moving commercial vessels transiting the region.37  Once aboard,
29 See Christopher Harress, Secret Flow of Somali Piracy Ransoms: 179 Hijacked Ships Gen-
erated Some $400M in Payments Since 2005. So Where Has It All Gone?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2013, 3:58 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/secret-flow-somali-piracy-ransoms-179-hijacked-ships-
generated-some-400m-payments-2005-so-where-has.
30 See Somali Piracy: More Sophisticated Than You Thought, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2013,
available at http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21588942-new-study-reveals-
how-somali-piracy-financed-more-sophisticated-you.
31 See id.; Harress, supra note 29.
32 Harress, supra note 29.
33 Somali Piracy: More Sophisticated Than You Thought, supra note 30.
34 See Michael Gagain, Neglected Waters: Territorial Maritime Piracy and Developing
States: Somalia, Nigeria, and Indonesia, 16 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 186–88 (2010).
35 Statement of Rear Adm. Joseph W. Kuzmick, supra note 10, at 2.
36 ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1, at 5.
37 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex A, at 2.
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pirates capture the crew and hijack the vessel, which are then used as
leverage in ransom negotiations, often yielding multi-million-dollar
payouts.38  It is estimated Somali pirates have received hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in ransom payments over the course of the past decade,
which they used to fund further piracy operations and expand their crimi-
nal enterprises to include other illicit activities.39  Factoring in additional
on-board security, vessel rerouting, increased insurance rates, and other
protective measures, piracy and related maritime crime in the region
“cost[ ] the international community billions of dollars annually.”40
Although incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Aden are now at their
lowest levels since 2006, ships still do not transit the region peacefully,
and “the conditions that allowed piracy to flourish still exist in Somalia
today.”41  Moreover, as Somalia sits along one of the world’s most vital
shipping corridors, the Gulf of Aden, piracy in the region has the ability
to undermine confidence in global sea lanes of communication, threaten
revenue and resources, increase maritime insurance rates and cargo costs,
and endanger the lives of seafarers.42  It is for these reasons that an-
tipiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa have become a focal point of U.S.
national security strategy in the region.43
2. Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia was the most pirate-infested region in the world be-
tween 1992 and 2006, with more than 450 attacks occurring in the year
2000 alone.44  This high incidence of piracy is partly attributable to the
region’s pirate-friendly geography, as it is home to more than 20,000
islands and countless waterways, as well as some of the world’s busiest
seaports and shipping lanes.45  The Strait of Malacca, for example, is
transited by nearly 25,000 containerships annually, linking the markets
of Asia and Europe.46 Such high-volume shipping provides pirates ample
targets to carry out their attacks.
38 Id.
39 Id. (citing BELLISH, supra note 13).
40 Id. annex A, at 1–2.
41 Id. annex A, at 1.
42 Id.
43 See generally id. annex A.
44 Carolin Liss, The Roots of Piracy in Southeast Asia, APSNET POLICY FORUM 1 (Oct. 22,
2007), http://nautilus.org/apsnet/the-roots-of-piracy-in-southeast-asia/#axzz2wdyez05O.
45 Id.
46 Marcus Hand, Malacca Straits Transits Hit All Time High in 2013, Pass 2008 Peak, SEA-
TRADE GLOBAL (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.seatrade-global.com/news/asia/malacca-straits-transits-
hit-all-time-high-in-2013-pass-2008-peak.html.
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Until recently, incidents of piracy occurring in Southeast Asia have
been characterized as less organized and more opportunistic.47 Attacks in
the region are often carried out in a quick hit-and-run style, using small
arms while vessels are anchored close to shore or tied up in one of the
region’s many ports.48  More recently, however, the IMB Piracy Report-
ing Centre has noted an increase in hijackings of larger coastal tanker
ships transiting the region, indicating a possible shift in pirate tactics.49
According to IMB reports, at least six tankers were hijacked for their
cargoes of diesel or gas oil between April and July 2014, “sparking fears
of a new trend.”50
Irrespective of the tactics employed, it is evident that pirate activity
is once again on the rise in Southeast Asia as of early 2015.51 In 2013
more than 125 incidents of piracy were reported throughout region, 106
of which occurred in Indonesian waters.52  This trend continued through
2014, with 141 attacks taking place in the region as a whole, and 100 in
Indonesia alone.53  Events in Indonesia accounted for nearly half of all
vessels boarded by pirates in 2014, with pirates in the region experienc-
ing some of the highest success rates in recent years.54  Although piracy
in Southeast Asia has been effectively managed by regional partnerships
in the past, the region’s high shipping traffic and critical shipping lanes
render the resurgence of piracy in the region both a U.S. and a global
concern.55
3. Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea
  As of late, West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea has emerged as the latest
hotbed for incidents of maritime piracy.56  Although piracy in Nigeria
and surrounding nations is nothing new—piracy in the region has
“waxed and waned” since the 1990’s57—larger attacks, including more-
frequent hijackings and kidnappings, “are of growing concern for both
mariners and the oil industry operating in the region.”58  IMB figures
47 Liss, supra note 44.
48 Id.
49 IMB Reports Worrying Trend of Small Tanker Hijacks in Southeast Asian Waters, ICC
(July 22, 2014), https://icc-ccs.org/news/947-imb-reports-worrying-trend-of-small-tanker-hijacks-in-
southeast-asian-waters.
50 Id.
51 ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1, at 5.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 8.
55 See The White House, supra note 17, annex B, at 1.
56 Id.
57 Id. annex B, at 2.
58 Id. annex B, at 1.
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show 51 reported incidents in 2013, accounting for roughly twenty per-
cent of all attacks worldwide that year.59  However, as incidents in the
region often go unreported, members of the Nigerian Navy estimate ac-
tual numbers to be closer to 100 attacks annually, with some “ten to 15
attacks every month in recent years.”60
While historically acts of piracy in and around the Gulf of Guinea
typically took the form of low-level robberies carried out against vessels
operating close to shore, hijackings for cargo theft, particularly petro-
leum products, now constitute a majority of incidents in the region.61
Pirates in the region are often more violent than their east African coun-
terparts,62 and significant numbers of kidnappings also occur.63  As out-
lined in the June 2014 U.S. Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action
Plan, “[w]hen maritime criminals focus on the high value cargo aboard
oil tankers and general cargo vessels, with little regard for the operators,
it becomes much more dangerous for mariners.”64
Of particular concern in the Gulf of Guinea is the region’s vital role
in the global energy market.65  The region produces more than 3 million
barrels of oil each day, roughly one third of Africa’s total output.66  Ni-
geria is also one of the world’s top exporters of liquefied natural gas.67
The United States plays a large role in the West African oil and gas
industries, and some seventy U.S. registered offshore supply vessels cur-
rently service the region.68  In October 2013 Nigerian pirates attacked
one such American supply vessel and abducted the captain and chief en-
gineer, leading to a three-week standoff concluded upon payment of an
undisclosed ransom by the shipping company.69  As further escalation of
pirate activity in West Africa will increasingly put U.S. citizens and in-
terests at risk, suppressing piracy in the region has become a focal point
of U.S. strategy in the region.70
59 ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1, at 5.
60 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, MARITIME PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA, 51 (2012),
available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTAWestAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_
PIRACY.pdf.
61 See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex B, at 2.
62 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 60, at 50.
63 See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex B, at 1.
64 Id.
65 See id. annex B, at 2.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. annex B, at 2–3.
69 Barbara Starr & Catherine E. Shoichet, 2 Seized in Pirate Attack off Nigeria, U.S. Official
Says, CNN (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/world/africa/nigeria-vessel-attack/
index.html.
70 See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex B.
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C. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO PIRACY
As piracy has reemerged to threaten mariners and the lawful use of
the maritime domain in recent years, resolving the issue has become a
matter of increasing importance to the United States and throughout the
international community.71  During this period a variety of antipiracy
tactics have been employed, including the adoption of numerous interna-
tional agreements, the deployment of naval task forces, and increased on-
board security measures, including the adoption of best management
practices.72  Additionally, prosecution efforts by a range of nations have
increased in recent years, with the threat of judicial sentencing providing
both a means of punishment as well as effective deterrence.73  Together
these measures have proved successful in reducing incidents of piracy in
many of the most dangerous regions of the world, and their continued
use will be critical to widespread eradication of the threat.74
First, the United Nations and other regional organizations have ena-
bled multinational antipiracy efforts through the adoption of partnership
agreements and the creation of information-sharing centers.75  This ap-
proach began with the 2004 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Com-
bating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP), entered into by twenty
Asian nations, which played a critical role in reducing incidents of piracy
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.76  The agreement provided an
opportunity for regional nations to collaborate in their efforts to patrol
the waters of the region and established an information-sharing center to
better facilitate cooperation.77  This model was subsequently followed as
the threat of piracy increased dramatically in Somalia and the Gulf of
Aden, where the United Nations Security Council adopted several resolu-
tions to enable similar coordination.78  The resolutions, implemented by
the so-called Djibouti Code, promote cooperation and information shar-
ing amongst a range of participating nations, and authorize foreign ves-
71 See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17.
72 See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annexes A, B.
73 Eugene Kontorovich, The Penalties for Piracy: An Empirical Study of National Prosecu-
tion of International Crime 1–2 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Scholarly Commons, Working Paper 211,
2012), available at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1210
&context=facultyworkingpapers.
74 See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex A, at 2–8.
75 See Djibouti Code of Conduct, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/
PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2015); Regional Information Sharing Centres, INT’L
MAR. ORG. (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Pages/MTISC-Gulf-
of-Guinea.aspx.
76 About ReCAAP, RECAAP.ORG, http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx (last vis-
ited Feb. 25, 2015).
77 Id.
78 Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 75.
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sels to enter Somali waters and use all means necessary to repress acts of
piracy in the region.79  Similar efforts are currently being implemented to
address the burgeoning piracy situation in West Africa.80
Second, several international naval fleets are dedicated to combating
piracy in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding Indian Ocean.81  Following
the adoption the Djibouti Code, the United States Navy established Com-
bined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) to conduct antipiracy missions off the
Somali coast.82  CTF-151 is a multinational force, with command rotated
between participating nations every four to six months.83  Additionally,
NATO has deployed fleets to the region as part of Operation Allied Pro-
tector, and the European Union established Operation ATALANTA to
fulfill the same role.84  Together, these forces, along with support vessels
contributed by other members of the international community, have en-
gaged in a variety of distinct antipiracy missions, ranging from incident
response and disruption to the establishment of patrol areas and protected
transit corridors.85
Third, the adoption of increased on-board security measures by ship-
pers has also led to a significant reduction in pirate attacks.86 For exam-
ple, most have adopted the Maritime Safety Committee’s Best
Management Practice Guide (BMPs), which emphasizes the need for
merchant vessels to take every possible measure to protect themselves
from pirates.87 The BMPs outline a number of on-board safety practices
and precautions that have helped better identify high-risk areas and pre-
vent attacks through communication with naval forces and defensive
measures.88  Additionally, the hiring of private armed security guards has
grown increasingly popular with shippers frequently transiting high-risk
areas.89  To date, not a single vessel with armed security guards has been
attacked; however, pirates have grown increasingly skilled at targeting
79 Id.
80 Regional Information Sharing Centres, supra note 75.
81 CTF-151: Counter-Piracy, COMBINEDMARITIMEFORCES.COM, http://combinedmaritime
forces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.; THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex B, at 2.
85 W. Michael Reisman & Bradley T. Tennis, Combating Piracy in East Africa, 35 YALE J.
INT’L L. ONLINE 14, 19 (2009).
86 See Statement of Rear Adm. Joseph W. Kuzmick, supra note 10, at 3.
87 See id.
88 See id. (“BMPs include the use of concertina, razor wire, and water hoses; transiting at
speeds above 16 knots; use of ship citadels; and avoiding high-risk areas.”).
89 See Repelling Pirate Attacks: The Measures To Protect a Ship, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10,
2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/culture/captain-phillips-film/10367534/security-
against-pirate-attacks.html.
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unprotected vessels, and many foreign states as well as some vessel types
forbid the use of firearms on board.90
Lastly, increased prosecution of pirates has become an integral part
of the international strategy to combat the threat.91 Several nations have
amped up prosecution efforts in recent years, with some 1400 pirates
now held in more than twenty nations around the world.92 Prosecution
provides an effective way to punish pirates for their actions, but it also
plays an important role in deterring pirates, as well as future pirates, from
pursuing the occupation.93 Still, as many as ninety percent of captured
pirates are released without facing prosecution, as evidentiary issues and
deficient domestic statutes make conviction a difficult task.94 As the
United States continues to take a leadership role in the fight against
piracy, insuring these obstacles do not impede prosecution as a means to
achieve the strategic objective is of vital importance moving forward.
III. MARITIME PIRACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
A. THE CRIME OF PIRACY AND THE UNIVERSAL-JURISDICTION
DOCTRINE
  Throughout modern history, the term “piracy” has been used to de-
scribe two distinct offenses: (1) piracy as a violation of a nation’s domes-
tic laws, known as “municipal piracy,” and (2) piracy as a violation of
customary international law, known as “general piracy.”95 At the domes-
tic level, municipal piracy includes any act deemed as such by statute.96
Violators of municipal piracy statutes may be prosecuted so long as there
exists a jurisdictional nexus between the prosecuting nation and the
crimes, such as acts occurring within a nation’s territorial waters or car-
ried out against a nationally registered vessel.97 For example, in the
United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1655 provides that on a vessel, “whoever . . .
lays violent hands upon his commander, to hinder and prevent his fight-
ing in defense . . . is a pirate.” While violators of this statute may be
considered “pirates” in the eyes of the U.S. government, such conduct
may not necessarily satisfy the definition of piracy under customary in-
90 See Statement of Rear Adm. Joseph W. Kuzmick, supra note 10, at 4–5; see also THE
WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex B, at 5.
91 Kontorovich, supra note 73, at 1.
92 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 10, annex A, at 2.
93 Id. annex A, at 3, 6.
94 See Dutton, supra note 14, at 239–41.
95 United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 605–06 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing Edwin D.
Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 335–36 (1925)).
96 Id. at 606.
97 Id.
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ternational law and would therefore require a jurisdictional nexus with
the United States in order to subject violators to prosecution under the
statute.
In contrast, general piracy, otherwise known as “piracy jure gen-
tium,” or “the international crime of piracy,” refers to “those offenses
that the international community agrees constitute piracy,” commonly re-
ferred to as customary international law.98  Significantly, in a case of
general piracy, any nation may assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals
committing the crime, regardless of any jurisdictional connection.99 For
example, general piracy statutes may apply to incidents of piracy occur-
ring in foreign countries in which no U.S. citizens or vessels were di-
rectly involved, as is often the case for incidents occurring off the coasts
of Africa. This authority stems from the international law doctrine of
universal jurisdiction.100 The universal-jurisdiction doctrine provides an
exception to the requirement of a jurisdictional nexus between a nation
and the extraterritorial activities of non-nationals, allowing any nation to
define and punish certain offenses recognized by the international com-
munity as a universal concern.101 General piracy is recognized as the first
universal-jurisdiction crime; the nations of the world have long consid-
ered pirates to be universal enemies of mankind, “[b]ecause [they] com-
mit[ ] hostilities upon the subjects and property of any or all nations,
without any regard to right or duty, or any pretence of public author-
ity.”102  Importantly, however, “it is only when a state proscribes piracy
in a manner that mirrors the international consensus definition . . . that
the state can assert the universal jurisdiction doctrine.”103
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME PIRACY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES
Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
authority to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
High Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”104 As expressed
by the language “piracies” and “offenses against the law of nations,” the
so-called “Define and Punish Clause” grants Congress the power to
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 606–07.
101 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987).
102 United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2013) (quoting United States v.
Brig Malek Adhel, 42 U.S. 210, 232 (1844)).
103 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (citing United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 722–24 (9th Cir.
2008)).
104 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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adopt both municipal and general piracy statutes.105 Congress has en-
acted legislation pursuant to this authority on several occasions through-
out history; however, “initial attempts by Congress to criminalize the
international crime of piracy proved difficult” because of the need for
statutory language that mirrored the customary international-law defini-
tion, which was susceptible to change over time.106
Congress first attempted to proscribe acts of piracy in accordance
with international law in section 8 of the Act of 1790.107 The Act defined
piracy as robbery, murder, or any other offense punishable by death,
committed by any person or persons on the high seas.108 This statute was
first put to the test in the Supreme Court in United States v. Palmer, in
which a group of suspected pirates was accused of attacking and captur-
ing a Spanish vessel on the high seas.109 The Court rejected the govern-
ment’s position that Congress intended the Act of 1790 to apply to
offenses committed by foreign nationals against foreign vessels and con-
cluded the statute was insufficient for the United States to invoke univer-
sal jurisdiction over the suspected pirates.110  The following year, in
response to the decision in Palmer, Congress passed the Act of 1819, this
time clearly expressing its intent to proscribe acts of piracy as an interna-
tional offense subject to universal jurisdiction.111 Section 5 of the 1819
Act provided in part, “[I]f any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on
the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of na-
tions, and such offender or offenders, shall afterwards be brought into or
found in the United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon
conviction thereof, . . . be punished with death.”112  Rather than attempt-
ing to specifically enumerate the types of piratical conduct forbidden by
international law, Congress opted to reference the international definition
so as to ensure the statute would proscribe exactly what is required to
invoke universal jurisdiction. Just a year after the enactment of the Act of
1819, the Supreme Court in United States v. Smith upheld the statute as
an acceptable exercise of authority by Congress and sufficient for pur-
poses of invoking universal jurisdiction over captured pirates.113 Al-
though section 5 of the 1819 Act was subsequently amended and
105 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 603–06.
106 Id. at 609.
107 See id. at 612.
108 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14.
109 See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818).
110 Palmer, 16 U.S. at 633–34.
111 Id.
112 Act of Mar. 3, 1819, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (emphasis added).
113 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820); see Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
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renewed by Congress in the Act of 1820, the language regarding acts of
general piracy remained unchanged.114
Today, 18 U.S.C. § 1651 serves as the United States’ sole general
piracy statute authorizing the exercise of universal jurisdiction.115  Sec-
tion 1651 provides, “Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or
found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”116  The statute,
which can be traced back to section 5 of the 1819 Act of Congress, has
retained the incorporation of the international definition by reference,
with the only significant change being a mandatory sentence of life im-
prisonment as opposed to death.117 Although the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia recently held that § 1651’s mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment as applied violated the Eighth Amend-
ment,118 it remains the sole statute arguably capable of reaching acts of
piracy lacking a jurisdictional connection to the United States.
C. “PIRACY AS DEFINED BY THE LAW OF NATIONS”
Because of § 1651’s reference to “piracy as defined by the law of
nations,” discerning the precise definition of piracy according to interna-
tional law is critical for the application of the statute. Fortunately, as the
judges deciding the most recent batch of piracy cases have now dis-
cussed this issue at length, it is now established that Article 101 of the
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) articulates
the current definition of piracy for purposes of the statute.119 As set forth
in UNCLOS Article 101, the following acts are prohibited by § 1651:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
  (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against per-
sons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
114 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
115 See id. at 623–30.
116 18 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (Westlaw 2015) (emphasis added).
117 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 617.
118 Said II, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515, 519–26 (E.D. Va. 2014).
119 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599; see United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 936–37 (D.C. Cir.
2013); United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 469 (4th Cir. 2012).
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(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described
in subparagraph (a) or (b).120
  U.S. courts first began applying the definition of piracy articulated in
UNCLOS Article 101 in a recent series of cases resulting from two So-
mali pirate attacks carried out against U.S. Navy frigates, the USS
Nicholas and USS Ashland, in 2010.121 Faced with discerning the defini-
tion of piracy for the sake of § 1651 for the first time in nearly 200 years,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ultimately con-
cluded that the number of parties to UNCLOS and widespread imple-
mentation of the agreement’s provisions indicated sufficient international
consensus.122 Although the United States has not yet signed or ratified
UNCLOS because of disagreements over certain elements of the treaty,
the United States has nonetheless accepted most elements of UNCLOS
as reflective of customary international law, or “the law of nations.”123
IV. MODERNIZING THE U.S. APPROACH TO MARITIME PIRACY
As set forth in the recent United States Counter Piracy and Maritime
Security Action Plan, increased prosecution of pirates is a critical com-
ponent of the national strategy for combating maritime piracy, protecting
U.S citizens, and safeguarding interests abroad.124 “[P]rosecution and
long prison sentences have directly challenged the impression of impu-
nity” surrounding the crime of piracy, and serve as a key deterrent to
current offenders and future recruits.125 However, as indicated in the
most recent series of prosecutions, existing piracy laws on the books in
the United States are at best poorly tailored to address acts of maritime
piracy in the twenty-first century, if not unconstitutional. For example,
although Congress has recognized varying degrees of offenders’ culpa-
bility in several municipal piracy statutes, there remains just one catchall
general piracy statute, encompassing an extremely broad scope of con-
duct yet imposing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment regardless
of the act.126 Moreover, as that statute’s sentencing requirement was re-
cently found to violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
120 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
3, 346, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/v1833.pdf (em-
phasis added).
121 United States v. Said (Said I), 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 680 F.3d
374 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010).
122 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 633–34.
123 Id. at 634.
124 See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17.
125 See id. annex A, at 3.
126 18 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (Westlaw 2015); see id. §§ 1652–1661.
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punishment,127 it remains uncertain whether the United States is even
capable of actively prosecuting suspected pirates in the absence of a clear
jurisdictional nexus if the circumstances do not warrant a life sentence.
A. THE CRIME OF PIRACY AS DEFINED BY THE LAW OF NATIONS HAS
EXPANDED TO ENCOMPASS A WIDE VARIETY OF CONDUCT
18 U.S.C. § 1651 is a unique statute in that it proscribes the offense
known as general piracy by reference to the definition of piracy accord-
ing to “the law of nations.” Rather than specifically enumerating any
particular kinds of conduct, the statute directs prosecutors to ascertain the
prohibited conduct by looking to codifications of customary international
law.128 Furthermore, although generally criminal statutes are to be inter-
preted according to their meaning when written, several courts recently
considering the application of § 1651 have concluded that the reference
to the “law of nations,” a changing body of law, demonstrates a clear
congressional intent to incorporate any subsequent developments in the
international definition of piracy within its proscription of the crime.129
Such an approach is ideal for purposes of exercising universal jurisdic-
tion, as it eliminates the need for constant amendments to ensure the
statute mirrors the international consensus definition. However, as the
nature of piracy operations,130 as well as the international definition of
piracy, has evolved to encompass various forms of ancillary or facilita-
tive conduct,131 § 1651 is now capable of reaching a significantly ex-
panded scope of criminal activity compared to when it was originally
adopted. As a result of this expansion, a wide variety of offenders are
subject to the statute’s mandatory sentence of life in prison, many of
whom would receive a significantly lesser punishment had their conduct
occurred on land or where a jurisdictional nexus could be established.132
  In the past, the crime of piracy was generally defined as an act of
robbery on the high seas.133 This was the definition incorporated in the
first U.S. piracy statutes and used by the Supreme Court in 1820 in
Smith.134  Relying on Smith, the robbery element was cited as recently as
2010 when used as a basis for granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss
127 Said II, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515 (E.D. Va. 2014).
128 18 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (Westlaw 2015).
129 See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 629–30 (E.D. Va. 2010).
130 See Somali Piracy: More Sophisticated Than You Thought, supra note 30.
131 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, supra note 120, at 436.
132 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1657 (Westlaw 2015) (imposing a maximum sentence of three years).
133 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 621–23.
134 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160–62 (1820); see United States v. Said, 757 F.
Supp. 2d 554, 559–61 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012).
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a piracy charge based on a failed attack, in United States v. Said (Said
I).135 Because the crime included the element of robbery, the number of
individuals within the reach of § 1651 was necessarily limited, and indi-
viduals suspected of other maritime related crimes had to be prosecuted
under different statutes.
Modernly, as discussed above, the definition of piracy for purposes
of § 1651 is set forth in UNCLOS Article 101 and is substantially
broader.136 Although UNCLOS Article 101 retains acts of high seas rob-
bery within the scope of the definition, a variety of other activities are
also included as constituting piracy.137 Most significantly, acts of inten-
tional facilitation of the more traditional piratical conduct are included
within the UNCLOS definition under subdivision (c),138 thereby render-
ing facilitative conduct equal to principal acts under § 1651. Addition-
ally, subdivision (b) defines as piracy any voluntary participation in the
operation of a pirate ship.139
The issue of facilitative conduct under § 1651 was addressed di-
rectly in two recent cases, United States v. Ali and United States v.
Shibin.140 In Ali, faced with the question whether a ransom negotiator,
whose conduct occurred almost entirely within Somalia’s territorial wa-
ters, could be charged with piracy under § 1651, a panel of the D.C.
Circuit answered in the affirmative, finding such conduct was the func-
tional equivalent of aider-and-abettor liability.141 The Fourth Circuit, in
Shibin, subsequently relied on the DC Circuit’s decision in Ali, convict-
ing a second ransom negotiator under § 1651 based on his involvement
in securing the release of the German merchant ship Marida Marguerite
in exchange for $5 million.142 These cases provide a perfect illustration
of the new expanded scope of § 1651, as neither defendant took part in
any physical attack on the vessels but rather came aboard once the
seizure had occurred.
Aside from the fact the defendants in Ali and Shibin were convicted
under § 1651 as negotiators rather than principal actors in the attacks,
these holdings are significant because of where the defendants’ conduct
occurred. Notably, in each case the defendant’s conduct took place al-
135 Said I, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559–61.
136 See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 469 (4th Cir. 2012); United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea art. 101, supra note 120, at 436.
137 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, supra note 120, at 436.
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233
(4th Cir. 2013).
141 Ali, 718 F.3d at 936–41.
142 Shibin, 722 F.3d 233.
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most entirely within Somali territorial waters as opposed to the high
seas,143 which is required for conviction as a principal under UNCLOS
Article 101(a).144  In holding that § 1651 authorizes the U.S. prosecution
of piracy facilitators whose conduct occurs within a foreign territory, the
courts in Ali and Shibin emphasized the lack of explicit geographical
language in UNCLOS Article 101(c).145 The Ali court pointed to the ab-
sence of the language “on the high seas” and “outside the jurisdiction of
any state” that appears in Article 101(a), and concluded that facilitative
conduct prohibited by Article 101(c) is not subject to the same geograph-
ical restrictions, so long as the conduct facilitated does occur on the high
seas.146 Although such an interpretation appears in line with settled prin-
ciples of statutory construction,147 the breadth of this holding becomes
more apparent when such a reading is applied to UNCLOS Article
101(b).
Much like UNCLOS Article 101(c), subdivision (b) of the same Ar-
ticle also lacks the explicit geographical language included in subdivi-
sion (a).148  Subdivision (b) provides that “any act of voluntary
participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge
of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft” constitutes piracy.149  Apply-
ing the same rules of construction, voluntary participation in the opera-
tion of a pirate ship, no matter where such participation occurs, is
sufficient to support a charge of piracy under § 1651. When read in tan-
dem with the UNCLOS Article 103 definition of a pirate ship, it is only
necessary that one voluntarily participate in the operation of a ship “in-
tended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of
committing one of the acts referred to in article 101” to be within the
statute’s reach and its mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.150
Although the courts provided no guidance on Article 101(b) and the
definition of “voluntary participation in the operation of” a pirate ship,
one can imagine how this vague language encompasses an extremely
broad scope of activities. In addition to sailing aboard a ship seeking to
carry out an attack, activities such as standing watch or preparing meals
143 See Ali, 718 F.3d at 934; Shibin, 722 F.3d at 236.
144 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101(a), supra note 120, at 436.
145 Ali, 718 F.3d at 937–41; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, supra
note 120, at 436.
146 Ali, 718 F.3d at 939–41.
147 Id. at 937 (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568,
573 (2009)).
148 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101(b),  supra note 120, at 436.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
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while ransom negotiations are on going may also be included.  As such
activities may occur anywhere, it is easy to see how the connection be-
tween those voluntary participants and actual pirate attacks may grow
increasingly attenuated. Yet because § 1651 draws no distinction be-
tween Article 101(a) and 101(b), offenders fitting either definition are
susceptible to the same charge and consequently the same punishment.
In sum, the use of UNCLOS and the interpretation provided by the
courts in Ali and Shibin results in a dramatic expansion of who may be
considered a pirate within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1651 and thus sus-
ceptible to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Although negotiating
ransoms and other intentional acts facilitating piracy are far from inno-
cent conduct, proscribing all such conduct under a single statute and im-
posing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without regard to
culpability is the precise reason the constitutionality of § 1651 was called
into question. Even if it is the position of both the United States and the
international community that ancillary acts contributing to pirate activi-
ties are acts of piracy in and of themselves, relying on a single statute
without allowing courts sentencing discretion to punish such acts runs
the risk of unconstitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, and as dis-
cussed further below, seemingly conflicts with the original intent of
Congress.
B. CONGRESS HAS ALREADY RECOGNIZED SEVERAL ACTS THAT
AMOUNT TO PIRACY, SOME OF WHICH CARRY LESSER
PENALTIES THAN LIFE IMPRISONMENT
Apart from the need to account for the recently expanded scope of
conduct now falling within the international definition of piracy and
therefore § 1651, a second reason for amending the current statutory sys-
tem is to more accurately reflect Congress’s intent regarding the punish-
ment of ancillary acts of piracy. More specifically, Congress’s decision
to adopt several other municipal piracy statutes, which expressly enumer-
ate certain ancillary acts of piracy such as those covered by UNCLOS
Article 101(b) and (c) discussed above, suggests a view that not all “pi-
rates” are deserving of the same punishment.151  As stated by the district
court in United States v. Said (Said II), “Congress has . . . expressed its
intent to punish lesser conduct of piracy by enacting other pirate stat-
utes,” all of which include corresponding punishments that generally are
less than mandatory life imprisonment.152 However, because these other
piracy statutes are municipal, rather than general, they cannot be applied
151 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1652–1661 (Westlaw 2015).
152 Said II, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515, 521 (E.D. Va. 2014).
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol45/iss2/4
2015] Davey Jones’s Lockup 143
in cases requiring the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Thus, under the
current system, whether a suspected offender will face § 1651’s
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, or a lesser punishment im-
posed by a municipal statute, may depend not on the conduct, but simply
whether the vessel attacked was registered in the United States or had
U.S. citizens on board.
Said provides an example of the overlap between § 1651 and an on-
point municipal statute incapable of use in a universal-jurisdiction
case.153 In Said, the defendant took part in an unsuccessful attempt to
attack a U.S. Navy frigate; the issue in the case was whether attempted
attacks amounted to piracy under § 1651.154 The court in Said I looked
to other sections of Title 18 during its analysis and concluded that, be-
cause 18 U.S.C. § 1659 criminalizes the exact conduct—attempted at-
tacks—the government sought to include under § 1651, the latter should
be read more narrowly so as not to overlap.155  The court deemed it illog-
ical, “in light of the ten year imprisonment penalty Congress promul-
gated for a violation of § 1659,” that a defendant who committed such a
minor act was meant to be exposed “to the penalty of life in prison for
piracy under § 1651.”156 Although this decision was later vacated on ap-
peal,157 the glaring inconsistency in punishment later arose in Said II, as
the defendant challenged the constitutionality of imposing life imprison-
ment for the incident in which no harm occurred.158
Similarly, facilitative conduct, now within the scope of § 1651, has a
municipal counterpart in 18 U.S.C. § 1657, which provides as follows:
Whoever attempts to corrupt any commander, master, officer, or mari-
ner to yield up or to run away with any vessel, or any goods, wares, or
merchandise, or to turn pirate or to go over to or confederate with
pirates, or in any wise to trade with any pirate, knowing him to be
such; or
Whoever furnishes such pirate with any ammunition, stores, or provi-
sions of any kind; or
Whoever fits out any vessel knowingly and, with a design to trade
with, supply, or correspond with any pirate or robber upon the seas; or
Whoever consults, combines, confederates, or corresponds with any
pirate or robber upon the seas, knowing him to be guilty of any piracy
or robbery; or
Whoever, being a seaman, confines the master of any vessel—
153 Said I, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012).
154 Id.
155 See id. at 563, 567.
156 See id. at 563.
157 See United States v. Said, 680 F.3d 374, 375 (4th Cir. 2012).
158 Said II, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515 (E.D. Va. 2014).
21
McCarthy: Davey Jones’s Lockup
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2015
144 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both.159
Confederating, “furnish[ing]. . .with. . .provisions of any kind” and “cor-
respond[ing] with any pirate or robber upon the seas,” are all the func-
tional equivalent of the sort of facilitative conduct—negotiating
ransoms—at issue in Ali and Shibin. However, because § 1657 is but a
municipal statute, and is therefore restricted in application to those acts
sharing a jurisdictional nexus with the United States, it cannot be used
for cases requiring the exercise of universal jurisdiction. This creates a
situation in which prosecutors must instead rely on the broader § 1651,
rather than the more appropriate § 1657, which imposes a significantly
lesser punishment of “not more than three years.”
Congress’s decision to enact numerous statutes proscribing various
forms of piracy and ancillary acts is evidence of its intent that these
crimes are distinct and deserve different punishments. Although in the
past such ancillary acts may have not fit within the definition of piracy
under customary international law, UNCLOS makes clear that view has
changed.160 Thus, because the international community now recognizes
these other forms of piracy, they may provide a basis for the exercise of
universal jurisdiction, so long as the domestic statutes are worded in a
manner that reflects customary international law. Rather than creating a
scenario such as Said II, in which § 1651 could be ruled unconstitutional
as applied because of the grossly disproportionate sentence of life in
prison for a crime Congress has stated deserves three years, Congress
should adopt statutes to reflect the language of UNCLOS Article 101(b)
and (c), allowing for commensurate punishment, so that universal juris-
diction may be exercised to the full extent permitted under international
law.
C. THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF IMPOSING MANDATORY SENTENCES OF
LIFE IMPRISONMENT IS INCONSISTENT WITH CONTEMPORARY
STANDARDS AND RUNS AFOUL OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
The final reason to amend the statutory scheme in place in the
United States for addressing acts of piracy in universal-jurisdiction cases
is to comply with the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits punishment
159 18 U.S.C.A. § 1657 (Westlaw 2015).
160 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, supra note 120, at 436.
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beyond what is proportional to the crime.161 As discussed above, when a
suspected pirate is charged under § 1651, he or she is subject to the stat-
ute’s mandatory sentence of life imprisonment regardless of the specific
circumstances of the conduct. Previously such harsh sentencing was in
line with the rest of the international community, in part because of the
more narrow definition of piracy, but sentencing practices have since
changed as the crime has evolved.162  Moreover, as seen in the case of
Said II, a statute that prevents courts from considering the actual harm
caused yet imposes a sentence life imprisonment may run afoul of the
Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.163
Although there is no international standard for the punishment of
piracy, comparing U.S. practices to those of other nations is particularly
useful for establishing the current disparity in sentencing. According to a
recent empirical study comparing piracy prosecutions around the globe
during the 2006–2010 period, the average sentence among pirate-prose-
cuting nations was sixteen years.164 At the low end of the spectrum are
Kenya, Holland, and Yemen, with minimum jail terms of 4.5 or 5
years.165 At the far opposite is the United States, imposing life sentences
as both the minimum and maximum. Although other nations imposed a
variety of sentence lengths in between the two extremes, the study
pointed out that excluding the U.S. cases from the data set drops the
mean to 12.6 years.166
Aside from the great disparity in sentence length between the United
States and other prosecuting nations, however, the most significant flaw
with the current approach of applying § 1651 is the failure to take into
account the specifics of the crime at issue. There are undoubtedly situa-
tions in which offenders are deserving of life in prison for their actions,
and all acts of piracy contribute to what is a serious threat to the free
flow of global commerce. Moreover, “the U.S. has a reputation for rela-
tively strict criminal punishment” compared to more lenient European
nations, and a disparity alone is not a reason to change sentence
lengths.167 However, a significant reason for this disparity stems from
the fact the United States does not take into account mitigating factors, or
a particular pirate’s culpability, and instead uses a life sentence for every
161 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also United States v. Said, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515, 519 (E.D. Va.
2014).
162 See Kontorovich, supra note 73, at 6–8.
163 Said II, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515.
164 Kontorovich, supra note 73, at 11.
165 Id. 
166 Id.
167 Id. at 13–14.
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offender charged under § 1651.168 Thus nonviolent negotiators who sat-
isfy the definition of a pirate under international law face the same pun-
ishment as those who attack, endanger, and harm or kill mariners.
Although nations are free to impose whatever punishments they see
fit,169 and such a practice certainly achieves the U.S. objective of deter-
rence, such a policy is incompatible with the Eighth Amendment.
When analyzing whether a sentence is “grossly disproportionate for
a particular defendant’s crime” as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment,
a court must compare the gravity of the offense and the severity of the
sentence.170 Significantly, as pointed out by the court in Said II, “what is
critical [in the analysis] is the gravity of the conduct of the individual
defendant.”171 The Supreme Court has listed several factors to be consid-
ered when assessing the gravity of a defendant’s conduct, including harm
caused, culpability, and the magnitude of the crime.172 Considering that a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment is the second most severe sen-
tence possible in our criminal justice system, it follows that a defendant’s
actions deserving of such punishment must be of a serious nature and
cause grave harm. Again, although there are undoubtedly acts of piracy
falling within this category, the broad scope of piracy in the modern era
includes a variety of deeds, some of which cause more harm than others.
For example, negotiators and other facilitators, while contributing to the
larger attack, are less culpable on an individual basis than those actually
attacking ships, particularly if no victim experiences physical harm.
The international community views piracy as a grave crime, with the
potential to seriously threaten the lives of mariners while disrupting the
freedom of the seas, and rightfully so. Moreover, as piracy in the modern
era depends on a variety of actors, both at sea and on shore, one cannot
ignore the fact that without facilitators the actual attacks cannot happen.
In fact, it is for this reason much of antipiracy strategies focus on taking
out the support systems that allow the attacks to happen.173 With that
said, the crime is also committed by several individuals, each of whom
plays a separate role in any given attack. The current system in place in
the United States for universal-jurisdiction cases instead relies on an um-
brella statute, grouping all pirates together and imposing mandatory
sentences of life imprisonment on all of them. With the term “piracy”
168 18 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (Westlaw 2015).
169 Kontorovich, supra note 73, at 6 (“[T]he courts of the capturing state shall ‘decide’ on the
penalties.” (citing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 106, supra note 120, at
437)).
170 Said II, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515, 519 (E.D. Va. 2014).
171 Id. at 521–22.
172 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–93 (1983); see Said II, 3 F. Supp. 3d at 522.
173 See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17.
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now encompassing such a broad scope of activities, the one-punishment-
fits-all approach is no longer appropriate, given the restrictions placed by
the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Instead,
establishing a series of statutes imposing commensurate punishments, or
at least allowing judicial discretion by removing § 1651’s life imprison-
ment mandate, will improve prosecutorial efficiency while incorporating
the evolving standards of punishment, as Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence commands.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
As explained above, the legal framework in place in the United
States to address acts of piracy, particularly in cases requiring the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction, has failed to keep up with the evolution of
the crime in the modern era. “Pirates,” as defined by UNCLOS, now
include a wide variety of actors, ranging from the traditional principals
who attack and plunder, to translators, negotiators, and other
facilitators.174 As a result of this expansion, the crime of piracy can no
longer be adequately addressed using just one statute mandating life in
prison, as is the current approach to all universal-jurisdiction cases. Not
only does such a practice raise concerns of unconstitutionality under the
Eighth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with contemporary interna-
tional standards of punishment.175 Moreover, because life sentences are
extremely costly, as is the litigation process in cases of such magnitude,
amending this system can lessen this burden while also improving effi-
ciency.176 Making the prosecutorial process more straightforward, with
clear statutes imposing appropriate punishments, can lessen the likeli-
hood of lengthy appeals, including those based on the sort of constitu-
tional challenge raised in the case of Said II.177
Fortunately, the necessary changes can be made rather simply. First,
Congress could continue to use the language of § 1651—“piracy as de-
fined by the law of nations”—but replace the mandatory minimum sen-
tence of life imprison with a range of, for example, ten years to life.
Doing so would ensure that the law would continue to incorporate devel-
opments in customary international law with respect to the crime of
piracy and permit the exercise of universal jurisdiction, but provide pros-
ecutors and judges with discretion in asking for and imposing punish-
174 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, supra note 120, at 436.
175 See generally Kontorovich, supra note 73.
176 See Marie Gottschalk, Days Without End: Life Sentences and Penal Reform, PRISON LE-
GAL NEWS, Jan. 15, 2012, available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/jan/15/days-with
out-end-life-sentences-and-penal-reform/ (discussing the costs associated with life sentences).
177 Said II, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515.
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ment. This would allow for the consideration of mitigating or
aggravating factors in each individual case, including actual harm caused
by the defendant’s conduct. Of course, prosecutors could still seek the
maximum punishment of life in prison when they see fit, but in cases
involving less severe acts of piracy, seeking a lesser sentence would
lessen the likelihood of facing an appeal, or even increase the possibility
of securing a plea. While the United States may continue to pursue a
policy of imposing relatively strict punishments for all forms of piracy as
a means of deterrence, those goals may still be achieved without impos-
ing a life sentence in every instance.
The second option is to adopt additional statutes proscribing acts of
piracy as defined in UNCLOS Article 101(b) and (c), or piracy facilita-
tion. As it is now established, UNCLOS serves as a codification of cus-
tomary international law on piracy,178 and universal jurisdiction may be
asserted in all cases involving conduct that UNCLOS defines as piracy.
Adopting statutes that mirror the language of UNCLOS Article 101(b)
and (c) will permit the United States to exercise universal jurisdiction
over such conduct, but also to impose punishment in accordance with the
original intent of Congress, as expressed in the several existing munici-
pal piracy statutes. Doing so would similarly make sentencing more pro-
portional to the specific crime as is required by the Eighth Amendment,
while lessening the burden that comes with lengthy trials, appeals, and
incarcerations.
As the United States has now established its intention to take a lead-
ership role in the international fight against piracy,179 adopting a statu-
tory system that ensures efficient and just prosecution of pirates to the
full extent permitted by international law is a necessary component of
achieving strategic goals. Prosecution is an effective tool for deterring
those considering future piracy operations, as well as punishing those
who harm U.S. citizens and interests, both directly and indirectly. How-
ever, the current one-statute-fits-all approach is ill suited for addressing
the complex nature of piracy in the modern era, and is incompatible with
the commands of the Constitution. Congress should amend this system to
account for the evolution of piracy in the modern era, as well as contem-
porary standards of criminal punishment.
178 See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 469 (4th Cir. 2012).
179 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, at 2.
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